Despite the large literature on anomalies in risky choice, very little research has explored the relevance of these insights in real insurance markets. This paper uses new data on consumers' choices of deductibles for home insurance to provide evidence that a surprising level of risk aversion over modest stakes is a reality in the market. Most customers purchase low deductibles despite costs signi…cantly above the expected value. Fitting these choices to a standard model of risk aversion yields implausibly large measures of risk parameters. Potential explanations and the implications of these results for understanding the market for insurance are discussed.
There are vast literatures in both theoretical and experimental economics examining how people make decisions about …nancial risks. Experiments have revealed a range of choice anomalies that are di¢ cult to explain within the standard expected-utility-of-wealth model (see Starmer (2000) and DellaVigna (2009) for reviews). In turn, a number of new models of decision-making under risk have been put forth, with Tversky's (1979, 1992) prospect theory making the most signi…cant impact on the …eld. Yet despite all this research very little has been done to explore the relevance of this work to real insurance markets.
1 Are these limitations of standard models important in market settings?
This paper uses a new data set on homeowners'choices of deductible levels for their homeinsurance policies to investigate this issue. In particular, I examine the relevance in this market setting of discussions of how averse people are to moderate …nancial risks. This topic was raised
by Arrow (1971) and Segal and Spivak (1990) and brought to the forefront recently by Rabin (2000) . Rabin demonstrated that if the only reason people are risk averse is the diminishing marginal utility of wealth -which is the sole explanation for risk aversion in the classic model -then they should be very close to risk neutral over any type of modest stakes. 2 Rabin's calibrations reveal that modest stakes include risks in the hundreds and even few thousands of dollars. One of the implications of this is that to the extent that people are actually averse to modest risks, understanding risk attitudes requires that economists step away from the simple standard framework and consider alternative psychological forces behind risk aversion.
Of course, part of the importance of this insight rests on the assumption that people are signi…cantly averse to moderate risks, a point which some have questioned (Watt (2002) , PalaciosHuerta et al.(2006) ) There is extensive evidence that people do display risk aversion over small stakes in laboratory settings (e.g., Holt and Laury (2002) , Harrison and Rutström (2008) ).
Outside of laboratory settings, there are many anecdotal accounts of market settings where people appear to pay a large amount to insure against very modest …nancial losses (e.g., Kunreuther and Pauly (2006) , Cutler and Zeckhauser (2004) , Rabin and Thaler (2001), Dreze (1981) , Pashigian, Schkade, and Menefee (1966) ). Demand for low deductibles, markets for cellular-phone insurance, and extended warranties all suggest that people fail to self-insure in the way the standard model would predict. However, there have been few micro-level empirical studies of the issue, and in fact the few existing studies have reported relatively low levels of risk aversion in markets for modest-scale insurance (Cicchetti and Dubin (1994) , Cohen and Einav (2007) ). 3 This paper provides the …rst micro-level evidence that aversion to modest-scale risk is significant in an important insurance market. As Section 1 describes, the data set covers a random sample of 50,000 standard policies from a large home-insurance provider and includes information on policy parameters, rating variables, and claims …led over a one year period. Customers chose their level of coverage from a menu of four available deductibles, $1000, $500, $250 and $100. Because losses to the customer are capped at the deductible, choosing a deductible lower than the $1000 maximum represents a modest increase in insurance on the order of $500, $750, or $900. The questions of interest, then, are a) whether many customers pay for this extra coverage, and b) to the extent they do, how costly that insurance is to them.
Section 2 presents the empirical choice patterns and reveals that customers in this market deviate substantially from a risk-neutral benchmark. The vast majority (83%) of homeowners in the sample paid for a lower deductible, and they did so at costs that far exceeded the expected value of that additional insurance. The most common choice was the $500 deductible and on average this group of customers paid $100 to reduce the deductible from $1000 to $500.
Because the data set contains information on claims …led by each customer, it is possible to calculate the average value of this additional insurance to those customers who purchased it.
Claim rates for this group were under 5%, implying that the additional coverage was worth less than $25 in expectation. A simple counterfactual analysis reveals that on average the customers who purchased lower deductibles paid …ve times more in additional premium than the extra insurance was worth.
These choice patterns lead to extreme measures of risk aversion when …t to a standard model with the typical identifying assumption that market participants hold correct subjective beliefs about loss probabilities. The analysis, presented in Section 3, exploits the fact that observing an individual's choices from the menu of available deductibles places bounds on the curvature of her utility-of-wealth function. Using standard assumptions and a range of conservative estimates for lifetime wealth, the lower bound on the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion needed to explain the choice of the median lower-deductible customer is consistently in the triple and quadruple digits. In contrast, most estimates for relative risk aversion generated from choices people make over larger-stakes contexts are in the single digits (e.g., Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Chetty (2006) ). Furthermore, the preferences are unrealistic on their face: with the preferences in the baseline speci…cation, 99.9% of the lower-deductible customers would be predicted to reject a gamble with an even chance of losing $1,000 or gaining any sum of money.
The argument that the diminishing marginal utility of wealth cannot be the explanation for attitudes toward moderate risks is clearly supported by this market data.
Section 4 discusses a number of potential explanations for the tendency to over-insure modest risks. The simplest explanation consistent with the choice patterns is that customers systematically overestimate the likelihood of accidents. In order to rationalize the choices with standard measures of risk aversion, the typical low-deductible customer would need a subjective claim rate of approximately 18%, around …ve times the true claim rate. This section also discusses the ability of reference-dependent preferences to account for the observed behavior.
Standard formulations of prospect theory cannot fully account for the observed demand for low deductibles. However, newer formulations of reference-dependent preferences , 2007 can potentially explain the observed willingness to pay for modest insurance with existing parameter estimates from other studies.
Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of the broader implications of this research.
In particular, I discuss the implications of these results to understanding the market structure of home insurance. A natural question here is if selling low deductibles is pro…table, why does competition not drive out these costly low-deductible policies? The answer is that the company does not actually appear to earn excess pro…ts from low deductible customers relative to high deductible customers. The main results of this paper show that the marginal cost of lower deductibles is not actuarially fair, which is the relevant question when asking whether consumers are displaying high risk aversion when buying this extra insurance. However, the average cost of insurance to low-deductible customers is justi…ed by the fact that they have higher claim rates, which is the more relevant question when considering the supply side. Because the lowdeductible customers have higher claim rates, which is consistent with sorting under adverse selection, if all of these customers decided to switch to high deductibles, the prices the …rm charges for high-deductible contracts would have to rise. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of these …ndings for how one thinks about the consumer-welfare e¤ects of the tendency to over-insure small risks.
Data Set
Background. The home-insurance industry in the U.S. is large and an important part of the broader property-casualty insurance market. Coverage is nearly universal, in large part because mortgage lenders require borrowers to insure their homes. While lenders require coverage, the homeowner is generally free to choose the insurance company and the details of the policy, including the deductible level.
The data for this study comprise a random sample of 50,000 policies in a single western state from a large home-insurance company. A recent year was chosen to be the sample year, and for each policy the characteristics of the home and policyholder known to the company at the beginning and the end of the calendar year were recorded. All 50,000 observations come from the same post-2000 year, and the data contain all rating variables.
Only standard policies were used, which excludes renters, commercial-property, and condominium insurance. These standard policies cover structures, personal property, and liability, and are in line with industry standards. They cover damage or loss due to theft, accidents, and weather, with weather-related incidents being the most frequent. However, as in the norm in the industry, ‡ood and earthquake damage are excluded. Beyond the cost of repairs or replacements, in the event that a home becomes uninhabitable, the company pays for living expenses, such as motel bills and meals at restaurants. The insurer will pay for losses up to speci…ed policy limits based on the insured value of the home. This insured value, in turn, is a 4 See Grace and Klein (2003a) and (2003b) for comprehensive studies of the industry.
re ‡ection of the estimated cost to rebuild the home and excludes the value of land.
The primary choice that homeowners have to make with their policies is the level of the per-claim deductible. Deductibles are not bundled with other features of coverage, and basic contracts di¤er only in the deductible level. At the time of the study, the available deductible levels at the study company were: $1000, $500, $250, and $100. The data include the chosen contract, the amount paid for the policy, and the alternatives each homeowner had available.
In addition to the information on the available menu, the company provided individual-level claims data. The data set includes the total number of claims each homeowner …led and the amount paid to them for losses occurring during the sample year.
Deductible Pricing. The insurance company uses a standard actuarial pricing scheme.
Let X i be the matrix of policyholder variables for customer i, including the insured value of the home, zip code, etc.. . . Then the deductible-premium menu is generated by:
where f (X i ) is a base price for the individual using a proprietary algorithm, j is a deductible speci…c factor, and g(X i ) is an additive adjustment term (known to me) derived again from a proprietary algorithm (unknown to me).
The base premium, f (X i ), is a function of the characteristics of both the home and policyholder that in ‡uence expected losses. The most important policy characteristic is the insured home value, and it turns out that, all else equal, rates are roughly a linear function of home value. The additive term, g(X i ); typically represents the purchase of additional coverage such as extended coverage for expensive jewelry.
Because premiums are adjusted for di¤erent deductible levels using a multiplicative factor, Policyholder 2 had a higher premium for the $1000 deductible contract than Policyholder 1, largely because Policyholder 2 had a higher insured home value. Policyholder 2, then, also faced a greater increase in cost for the alternative of a $500 deductible.
Empirical Choice Patterns
Sample Averages. Summary statistics for the full sample of homeowners are given in Table 1 .
Panel 1a provides a summary of important policy variables, and reveals that the vast majority (82.7%) of customers in the full sample held one of the two middle deductibles. Forty-eight percent of customers held the $500 deductible and 35% the $250. Just over 17% of customers held the $1000 deductible, while less than 1% selected the $100 level.
Panel 1b describes the average deductible-premium menu, and is a good starting place to look at the costs associated with these di¤erent choices. Looking at the full sample, the average customer was o¤ered a policy with a $1000 deductible for roughly $615 and had to pay an extra $100 (i.e. $715) for the $500-deductible policy. At these prices a risk-neutral individual would choose the $500-deductible policy only if she believed that her claim rate under the $500 deductible would be at least 20% ( 715 615 1000 500
). 5 In contrast, one can see from panel 1a that actual average claim rates were less than 5%. The analogous calculation for the $250 deductible using the $500 alternative yields a risk-neutral claim rate of roughly 35%, and for the $100 deductible compared to the $250 alternative the …gure is an extremely high 88%. The extraordinary marginal cost of the $100 policy helps explain why so few customers held that deductible.
Of course, looking only at the average menu could be misleading. Because there is heterogeneity in the cost customers face for lower deductibles, it is important to analyze the value of the lower deductibles to those who actually paid for them. The last four columns of Panel 1b
give the average deductible-premium menu broken down by chosen deductible. As one might expect, those who faced higher costs for lower deductibles were more likely to forgo that extra insurance. The $1000-deductible policyholders faced an average additional cost of $130.89 to hold the $500 deductible. The $500-deductible customers instead had a lower average additional cost ($99.85) to move from the $1000 to $500 level and chose to pay that amount, but did not pay the average $86.54 more that it would have cost them to hold the $250 policy.
Those who held lower deductibles paid far more than the expected value for that extra insurance. Those with the $500 deductible had an average claim rate of 4.3% (Panel 1a of Another way of quantifying the average di¤erence between cost and expected value for these customers in presented in Table 2. This table presents Patterns for New Customers. These results are for the full sample of homeowners, which includes individuals who started their coverage with the company at di¤erent times. One might conjecture that those insured longer would be more sophisticated insureds, and might 6 If each loss exceded $1000, then for the .043 expected claims each year, a customer with a $500 deductible can expect her insurance to pay out $21.50 [.043*(1000-500)] more than a customer with a $1000 deducitble. If some of the .043 expected losses would not excede $1000, then the lower deductible is worth less to the customer. 7 The median savings for this group was $109.35.
forgo the expensive lower deductibles. Figure 1 reveals, however, that those insured with the company for longer were actually more likely to hold one of the lower deductibles. For instance, less than 10% of those who had been insured with the company for 3 years or less held the $250 deductible, while those insured 11-15 years chose this level 60% of the time.
While on the surface this pattern might seem to suggest that those insured longer had a higher demand for low deductibles, it seems likely that it is actually the result of consumer inertia. The menu of deductibles o¤ered by the company in the state was constant over time, but in the past low deductibles were cheaper. This is because the relationship between deductible costs and insured home value has remained roughly constant over time. As home values have risen, there has been a corresponding rise in the premium di¤erences for di¤erent deductibles.
Of course, individuals are free to update their deductible at any time. But renewal notices do not list the current menu, and there is growing evidence that even when there is signi…cant money at stake, individuals often fail to adjust their initial choices over time. 8 Therefore, for some homeowners it is likely that the observed choice of lower deductibles partially re ‡ects inertia and not solely an active choice re ‡ecting risk preferences.
Analyzing variation in the marginal cost of lower deductibles gives suggestive support for this inertia hypothesis. Figure 2a provides a graph of the fraction of customers who held a deductible lower than $1000 by the cost the customers faced to reduce the deductible from $1000 to $500. 9 The …gure clearly shows that newer customers are responding more strongly to variation in the current cost of holding lower deductibles than customers who have been insured longer. At a marginal cost of $50 to lower the deductible, 95% of customers insured longer than 10 years and 90% of those insured less than 3 years purchased a lower deductible.
However, at a higher marginal cost of $100, the fraction purchasing the lower deductible among newer customers falls to 67% but changes very little for long-term insureds. Table 2 showed that there are substantial expected savings from switching to the high deductible for the average low-deductible customer. The bottom panel Figure 2 provides a way of looking at the heterogeneity in this potential savings, by graphing the expected savings from switching to the high deductible as a function of the marginal cost of lowering the deductible from $1000 to $500. The line would lie along zero if lower deductibles were priced actuarially fairly from the perspective of the customers. This …gure shows, however, that across the entire range low-deductible customers could have expected signi…cant ex-post savings from holding the $1000 deductible. The potential savings are higher for the longer-tenure customers across the spectrum of costs, because a greater fraction of them held the $250 deductible, which is a worse buy ex-post than the $500 deductible.
While consumer inertia seems to play an important part in this market, concentrating on the choices of newer customers, the demand for lower deductibles is still very strong. From Figure 2 it is clear that the majority of customers who had been with the company for 3 years or less chose the lower deductibles when the additional cost was below $130. Roughly 12% of the sample consisted of customers who were new to the company in the sample year -these could be new homeowners or homeowners previously insured with other companies.
For these homeowners consumer inertia is not an issue at all. The majority (61%) of these new customers also chose the middle deductibles, with 55% holding the $500 and 6% the $250.
Only 3 customers (0.05%) held the $100, while the remaining 39% held the $1000 deductible. Table 2 reveals that, just as in the full sample, the new customers who chose a lower deductible paid much more than that extra coverage was worth in expectation. On average these customers paid roughly …ve times what this extra insurance was worth in expectation.
Panel b of
The analysis in the remainder of the paper will focus on the choices of these new customers, who made their deductible choices under the current menu.
Industry Comparisons. These …ndings are likely to apply to the homeowners-insurance market more broadly. Grace and Klein (2003b) provide an industry overview and assert that most homeowners carry …xed deductibles, "...with $250-$500 being the most common." The rating structure is also broadly consistent with those at other companies. For instance, Cutler and Zeckhauser (2004) report premium di¤erences of over $200 between contracts with $1000
and $500 deductibles for two example policies in Philadelphia and Orlando. Similar magnitudes are also found in the California Department of Insurance's 2006 online survey of homeownersinsurance premiums. As for claim rates, the industry reports (www.iii.org) somewhat higher national claim rates (8.4%) than those seen here, however these may be a¤ected by the more extreme weather in the Midwest and South. In a study of the home insurance industry in California, Singh (2004) reports an average yearly claim frequency of 5.5% per insured home.
Taken all together, then, it appears that the menu, prices, and (at least in western states) the claim rates observed in this sample are all in line with those at other companies.
Magnitude. These payments for low deductibles represent "real money" at both the individual and aggregate levels. If these patterns hold nationally, a partial-equilibrium backof-the-envelope calculation suggests that homeowners could expect to save a total of roughly $4.8 billion per year by holding the highest available deductible. 10 As Section 5 discusses in detail, however, this is only a partial-equilibrium result. chance of losing more than $1,000 by holding the high deductible.
Standard Model: EU(W)
This section analyzes deductible choices within a standard expected-utility-of-wealth model.
Following the framework in Chetty (2006), it assumes customers respond to risks based on an (indirect) utility-of-wealth function, where wealth is the present value of lifetime income.
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To examine the deductible-choice situation, imagine the individual faces a choice between one-year insurance contracts with yearly premium, P , and deductible, D. Assume that other than a loss to the home, the individual faces no other risk to lifetime wealth. Furthermore, assume for simplicity that the individual faces at most one loss during the year that occurs 10 60 million homes, 80% with "low deductibles", and an expected savings of $100. 11 Chetty's discussion helps to clarify that the appropriate measure of wealth should be related to permanent income, rather than measures such as physical wealth and monthly income that are often used in the literature. with probability (I relax this assumption below) and holds accurate subjective beliefs about the likelihood of a loss. Finally, assume that all losses exceed the highest deductible under consideration, which simpli…es the analysis and overstates the value of lower deductibles.
Under these assumptions the expected utility of the contract with premium P and deductible D for loss probability is given by:
where u is the Von Neumann-Morgenstern (indirect) utility function over wealth and w is the individual's level of initial wealth. Given a choice between contracts, the individual chooses the contract j that maximizes her expected (indirect) utility:
Allowing for the possibility of multiple losses during the year, and recalling that the deductible is per-claim, this expression becomes: max j P n n u(w P j nD j ) for n = 0; 1; 2; :::, where n is the probability of incurring exactly n losses to the home during the year.
Generating Bounds on Risk Aversion. If the utility function u has only one parameter (say ) controlling the level of risk aversion, observing an individual's choice between deductible levels places bounds on that parameter. For a homeowner who chose the $1000 deductible, we can …nd an upper bound because there is a unique such that she would be indi¤erent between the $1000 and the $500-deductible contracts. For those who chose the $500 deductible, because we observed that the individual preferred this level to the $250 and $1000 alternatives respectively, we can …nd both an upper and lower bound. The alternatives of the $500 and $100 deductibles provide similar bounds for those who chose the $250 deductible.
I have calculated the bounds on risk aversion for each individual implied by the individual's choice using the common constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) functions for u. CRRA utility is given by u(x) =
x 1 1 for 6 = 1, and u(x) = ln(x) for = 1. The parameter is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion; = 0 is the risk neutral case, while > 0 implies risk aversion. CARA utility is given by
where r is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. Another way to interpret the risk aversion seen here is to follow the spirit of the "Rabin
Critique" (Rabin, 2000) and ask how individuals with these preferences would respond when o¤ered other gambles. Taking the lower bound on , for each low-deductible customer from
Model 1 I calculated whether there existed a gain, G, that would make the homeowner willing 12 Because there is not a closed-form solution for these bounds, I used a simple search algorithm to calculate for each individual in the sample the cuto¤ value of (CRRA) or r (CARA) for indi¤erence between any two deductible-premium pairs.
to accept a 50-50 lose $1,000 / gain G gamble. With these preferences, for 99.95% of the 3,791 new customers who chose either the $250 or $500 deductible there exists no gain that could compensate them for a 50% chance of losing $1,000.
Robustness Checks. Of course the results for Model 1 are sensitive to the assumptions about lifetime wealth and subjective claim rates. The rest of Table 3 reveals, however, that the conclusions hold under a range of assumptions. Consider …rst the measure of claim rates.
Using the deductible-level average claim rate for the chosen deductible eliminates any bias resulting from adverse selection or moral hazard on the choice of deductible. However, even within a deductible level it could be the case that there is some degree of adverse selection. As discussed in the previous section, customers face heterogenous costs of lowering their deductible.
Those who paid more for the lower deductible might be expected to …le more claims than others with the same deductible, which might bias the results somewhat. To address this, I ran basic
Poisson regressions of claim rates on the policy variables that a¤ect premiums and used the predicted values from this regression as a predicted measure of individual claim rates. These regression results are presented in Table 4 . The coe¢ cients on the policy variables generally have the predicted sign but are quite small in magnitude, revealing that within a deductible level the policy variables have little predictive power on claim rates. As Table 3 shows (Model 2), using this alternative measure of claim rates actually raises the bounds on risk aversion slightly, but does not meaningfully change any of the results.
The measure of lifetime wealth is a more important consideration. Lifetime wealth of $1 million is likely to be a reasonable conservative estimate of permanent income for these individuals, who own homes with average insured values (i.e., excluding the value of land) of around $200,000. Nonetheless, the basic conclusions here are robust even if one considers much lower levels of lifetime wealth. Models 3 through 7 of the table use decreasing levels of initial wealth, including individual insured home values (Model 4). Even if one were to assume a lifetime wealth of only $100,000 for these homeowners (Model 5), the lower bounds on risk aversion are still more than 100 times those of the Chetty and Gourinchas-Parker studies and continue to predict strong rejections of a 50/50 gamble with a downside of losing $1,000.
The table also includes results using values of lifetime wealth of $50,000 and $5,000. These are clearly unrealistically low estimates of lifetime wealth, but they are instructive cases in at least two ways. First, they provide comparable estimates of the CRRA parameter for studies that report measures of using wealth measures such as monthly or yearly income. Second, and more importantly, they highlight that although extremely low initial wealth leads to single-digit measures of risk aversion, when initial wealth is low single-digit CRRA parameters still imply extreme risk aversion. For initial wealth of $5,000 the implied lower bound on is less than 7 for over 75% of the $500-deductible customers. Yet with these implied preferences, virtually none of these individuals would be willing to accept a 50/50 gamble with a downside of losing $1,000. Low wealth can reduce the measure of risk aversion, but it cannot make the observed behavior consistent with realistic attitudes toward the hypothetical gamble.
A …nal way to approach the question of initial wealth is to use the CARA utility speci…cation, which does not depend on initial wealth. Model 8 in Table 3 presents bounds on risk aversion assuming individual-estimate claim rates and CARA utility. To ease comparisons, the CARA measure of absolute risk aversion has been converted to a measure of relative risk aversion by multiplying the results by 1 million. As such, the result for Model 8 is directly comparable to Model 1. The results with the CARA speci…cation are almost identical to those with the CRRA speci…cation and again would imply incredibly risk-averse reactions to a gamble with a potential downside of losing $1,000. These CARA results can also be compared to the level of risk aversion found in the deductible choice of Israeli automobile drivers. Cohen and Einav (2007) estimate a median coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion from a CARA utility function of 3 10 5 , which is orders of magnitude lower than the median lower bound for the $500 customers here of 2 10 3 . I return to this comparison in the …nal section.
Homeowners may face substantial background risk to their wealth, which was not captured in the model. If other risks to lifetime wealth are uncorrelated with losses to the home, the results do not change meaningfully. For example, a person could face a 50/50 chance of losing their current job, which might lower lifetime wealth from say $1 million to $100,000. Table 3 shows, however, that even with a sure lifetime wealth of $100,000 the deductible choices imply extreme risk attitudes. The more relevant worry would be if background risk to lifetime wealth were correlated with losses to the home, in which case in the event of a loss the marginal value of a dollar would be especially high. Except in very rare cases, such as people who run businesses from their homes, home accidents are unlikely to be correlated with other shocks to lifetime wealth.
Potential Explanations
The results in Section 3 suggest that people pervasively over-insure modest risks when making home-insurance purchases. The amount of risk aversion that is consistent with the diminishing marginal utility of wealth is simply not enough to account for these choices in a rational expectations frameworks. The question, then, is why people pay for this insurance. The nature of the available data make it di¢ cult to conclusively test between potential explanations. However, this section discusses some of the leading potential explanations for the over-insurance of these modest risks and provides some simple metrics of how plausible each possibility is as a full explanation for the observed behavior.
Risk Misperception. Perhaps the most obvious potential explanation for these results is that people may have standard risk preferences but may not have accurate subjective beliefs about claim rates. Of course, without information on subjective beliefs this possibility cannot be tested, and indeed such an explanation could be given to virtually any …nding of deviations from risk neutrality in a market setting. However, the bias in subjective beliefs would need to be quite high and widely held to explain the observe choices. For instance, assuming lifetime wealth of $1 million, the choice of the $500 deductible by the average new customer is consistent with a single-digit coe¢ cient of risk aversion only for a subjective claim rate of 18.3% -nearly 5 times the observed claim rate of 3.7%. For more modest overestimation of claim frequency, the high estimates of risk aversion remain.
Consumption Commitments. Chetty's (2006) framework for expected utility of wealth assumes that people can costlessly smooth consumption over the lifecycle. As Chetty and Szeidl (2007) point out however, many consumption choices (e.g., housing) are costly to adjust in the short run, and as such an individual facing moderate risks may choose to smooth those risks over only a portion of consumption (e.g., food expenditures). This pattern raises the local curvature of the (indirect) utility function and makes a person more risk averse over moderate stakes than his global utility function would imply. While clearly relevant to deductible choice, as Chetty and Szeidl note, these considerations cannot plausibly explain the choice to pay roughly $100 to insure against a 4% chance of an extra $500 loss. For instance Chetty (2003) provides a calibration of the local curvature of the utility function and …nds a CRRA parameter of 7.37. While considerably higher than the CRRA parameter of 1.25 that he (Chetty 2006) estimates for the global utility, a CRRA parameter of 7.37 is still an order of magnitude or two too low to explain the observed deductible choices.
Borrowing Constraints. Along the lines of consumption commitments, it could also be possible that individuals are severely liquidity constrained and cannot borrow. This is unlikely to be a serious consideration for the majority of homeowners in the sample, who live in rather expensive homes. Even …rst-time home buyers, who have just made a large downpayment, typically have access to more than $1,000 in credit. Furthermore, it is not entirely obvious which way extreme liquidity constraints should bite in deductible choice. On one hand a lower deductible is appealing because a liquidity-constrained homeowner may not be able to cover the cost of repairs under a high deductible. On the other hand, there is ‡exibility in whether to make repairs if a loss occurs (e.g., one need not replace a stolen television), and the money saved up-front by choosing a higher deductible is especially valuable to a temporarily liquidity-constrained individual.
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Role of Sales Agents. Another possibility is that homeowners are not particularly risk averse but are in ‡uenced or pressured to take the more expensive lower-deductible contracts by the company's sales agents, who earn partial commissions. While this is a possibility, it is important to note that it is much easier to sell someone something they want in the …rst place. Furthermore, because this company is not one of the lowest-cost providers, the agents frequently suggest high deductibles as a way of lowering policy costs. The data also suggest that the agents are not simply controlling the choices. Over time as policy costs have risen, customers have shifted away from the lowest deductibles, which makes sense for the customer but goes against the incentives of the sales agents.
Menu E¤ects. The available menu itself may a¤ect choices. People have a tendency to avoid picking the extreme options from a menu and may be reluctant to pick the highest or lowest deductible available. If they are unsure of their preferences, they may also infer information about the appropriate choice from the available menu, as in the model by Kamenica (2008) . This e¤ect is likely at play to some extent in this market, but it would be hard to argue that it could be the sole explanation for the observed choice patterns. Given the costs here, these menu e¤ects would have to be quite strong to lead risk-neutral individuals away from the $1000 deductible. In addition, while menu e¤ects could explain the choice of the $500 or $250 deductible, they do not account for which of the two customers pick. In particular, they have di¢ culty accounting for why, despite an unchanging menu, subjects have switched from the $250 to the $500 deductible over time.
Reference-Dependent Preferences. The …nal explanation worth consideration in this section is the possibility that consumers are choosing low deductibles in accordance with their risk attitudes, but that risk attitudes over modest stakes are driven by considerations other than the diminishing marginal utility of wealth. The leading alternative models of risk preferences come from Tversky's (1979, 1992) work on prospect theory. In prospect theory, decision makers focus narrowly on a particular risk and evaluate the outcome compared to a reference point. Prospect theory provides an explanation for …rst-order risk aversion over modest stakes through the concept of loss aversion, the idea that even small losses are signi…cantly more painful than equivalent gains are pleasurable. Loss aversion is represented by the well-known "kink" in the prospect theory value function at the reference point. Rabin (2000) suggests that loss aversion is one of the more likely explanations for individuals high levels of risk aversion over modest stakes.
However, there has long been a recognition within the literature that standard formulations of prospect theory cannot fully explain insurance purchases over modest stakes. The reason is that since insurance involves paying money to reduce losses, the decision is entirely within the "loss domain" and away from the kink in the value function. As such, loss aversion does not a¤ect insurance purchases in standard prospect theory. In fact, because most estimates of the prospect theory value function are convex over losses (i.e., exhibit "diminishing sensitivity"), in prospect theory people are slightly risk loving over losses.
The only explanation for modest-scale insurance purchases in prospect theory comes from the observation that people tend to overweight small probabilities in their decision making. 14 14 The evidence on probability weighting suggests that many people overweight low-probability
With a linear value function, the di¤erence in the price ( P ) a customer would pay for an insurance contract with a lower deductible is simply the weighted probability of a loss multiplied by the di¤erence in deductible levels:
15 Conventional estimates of probability weighting, however, can only account for around half of the observed willingness to pay for lower deductibles. For example, if one uses this simple formula with the functional form and parameter estimate for probability weighting reported in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , a customer with a 4% probability of a loss would be willing to pay around $45 to lower the deductible from $1000 to $500. That is a little more than twice the expected value, but far below the $95 that new customers at the company actually paid for low deductibles.
Newer models, particularly Rabin (2006, 2007) , suggest a way in which referencedependent preferences could lead to purchases of costly modest-scale insurance. In the Köszegi-Rabin framework, feelings about money given up for a purchase are segregated from attitudes toward surprise losses.
16
The idea is quite similar to Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) , who argue that money given up as part of a transaction is a "cost"and does not induce the psychological pain of a "loss", what they call the "no loss in buying"hypothesis. In these frameworks, then, loss aversion a¤ects attitudes toward money paid when an accident happens (i.e., the deductible) but not the amount of money paid up front for the policy. This di¤erence means that loss aversion can increase the willingness to pay for insurance. Following the discussion in Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) , the willingness to pay calculation from the last paragraph can instead be given by: P = w( ) D, where is the coe¢ cient of loss aversion. Kahneman and Tversky's original estimates for prospect theory give a value of of 2.25. This would imply a willingness to pay for the $500 deductible for a customer with a claim rate of 4% of just over $100, which is consistent with the observed willingness to pay for the low-deductible customers in this market. As such, this reference-dependent framework can potentially rationalize the observed choices using existing parameter estimates from other studies.
events and underweight high-probability events when making decisions. For background and evidence on probability weighting, see Camerer and Ho (1994) , Prelec (1998) , Kahneman (1979, 1992) , Tversky and Fox (1995) , Tversky and Wakker (1995) , and Wakker and Tversky (1993) . 15 Here is the objective probability of a loss and w() is the probability weighting function that transforms the objective probability into a decision weight. 16 See the discussion of Choice Acclimating Personal Equilibria in Köszegi and Rabin (2007) .
Discussion
The results of this paper suggest that there may be value in exploring alternative preference models in applied work on insurance markets. Doing so may open up new insights about behaviors and may generate policy prescriptions in areas such as health insurance and annuities.
It also may be useful in rationalizing seemingly disparate results across di¤erent domains of insurance. For example, Cohen and Einav (2007) …nd much lower levels of risk aversion in their study of deductible choice than I …nd here. The most obvious potential reason for the di¤erence is simply population heterogeneity: it is reasonable to suspect that Israeli drivers are substantially less risk averse than American homeowners. On the other hand, the referencedependent model, and speci…cally probability weighting, suggest another mechanism that may be at work. Typical estimates of the weighting function imply much less severe overweighting of probabilities in the range of 20-30%, which is what the drivers in the Israeli sample experienced, than they do for low probabilities like the 4-5% chance of a homeowners insurance loss. It is unclear whether that dynamic actually accounts for the di¤erences; yet it is clearly an example of a potential research direction for future work on insurance behavior.
Although the focus in this paper is on consumer choice, it is also reasonable to step back and consider the implications of these results for the understanding of the supply side of this market. The most obvious question that arrises here would seem to be whether the company is making excess pro…ts on customers who purchase low deductible. If so, why does competition not lead new companies to o¤er these low-deductible contracts at reduced prices?
A look at the pro…tability of these contracts suggests that prices may be consistent with a competitive equilibrium. The company earns roughly similar pro…ts from low-deductible and high-deductible customers. That might at …rst seem surprising in light of the …ndings presented above. However, the important thing to note is that the results above demonstrated that the marginal cost (to customers) of lowering the deductible exceeded what that additional insurance was worth to the customers. That is the relevant comparison from the customers' perspective, since their losses are capped at the deductible. For the …rm, however, because losses can be quite large, the pro…tability of di¤erent groups of customers depends a great deal on whether there are di¤erences in claim rates between the groups. For example, with average claim payouts around $5,500, a claim-rate di¤erential of even 1% would mean that in equilibrium the company would need to collect an extra $55 from the low deductible customers in order to equalize pro…ts between the groups. The average cost of matters to the company. Table 5 provides suggestive evidence that lower-deductible customers do in fact have higher claim rates than their high-deductible counterparts and that the average pro…t level for the two groups of customers are quite similar. The top portion of the table shows raw claim rates and pro…tability levels for the two deductible groups. 17 The claim rate for new customers who held the $500 deductible was 3.7% compared with 2.1% for those with $1000 deductibles; restricting to accidents over $1000, the claim rates are 3.2% and 1.8% respectively. The third column shows that in the raw data, the $1,000 policies are actually more pro…table than the $500-deductible policies ($577 vs. $502). This re ‡ects the fact that the company has higher pro…t rates on more expensive houses and those households are more likely to hold high deductibles. To create a direct comparison of similar household with di¤erent deductible levels, the bottom part of the table uses propensity-score matching that controls for all of the policy characteristics used in pricing the contracts. The matching estimation reveals that $500-deductible customers yielded an average $22.49 higher pro…t for the company relative to their $1000-deductible counterparts.
This di¤erence is statistically insigni…cant and is much lower than the $77.37 …gure from the analysis from the consumer perspective in the previous section. In addition, considering that this …gure does not include claim-processing costs, the di¤erence in equilibrium pro…tability of the low-deductible and high-deductible customers is probably very small.
These results put the consumer-welfare costs of purchasing low-deductibles into perspective.
Individual customers could bene…t …nancially by avoiding over-insuring modest risk. However, if all homeowners changed their behavior, the company would likely need to raise insurance costs or create a new higher deductible in order to separate the more and less risky customers. This is the reason that the back-of-the-envelop calculation on aggregate savings in Section 2 is a partial equilibrium result. The market as it exists now is inconsistent with standard risk preferences. But if all customers had standard risk preferences, the new market equilibrium would not necessarily be welfare improving for the customers. This result highlights that there 17 The measure of pro…t used here is simply the di¤erence between the premium collected for a policy and the amount paid out to the customer for claims.
are often subtleties when considering the ability of …rms to exploit consumer biases in market settings and suggest that a careful examination of these issues should be a priority for research going forward. In particular, a given individual might bene…t from debiasing that caused him to avoid purchasing low deductibles, but a policy aimed at changing all consumers'behavior is unlikely (at least in home insurance) to improve the equilibrium for the consumer. figure (2A) shows the fraction of customers who held a deductible of $500 or lower as a function of the cost the customer faced to reduce the deductible from $1000 to $500. The bottom figure (2B) shows the average potential savings that the customers who held a deductible of $500 or lower could have expected to receive by switching to the high deductible, again as a function of the cost these customers paid to lower the deductible from $1000 to $500. These graphs use locally-weighted kernel regressions using quartic kernels with bandwidths of 10 and 20 for figures 2A and 2B respectively. The blue lines are for customers insured with the company for 3 years or less, while the red lines are for customers insured for at least 10 years consecutively with the company. Average forgone expected savings for all low-deductible customers: $81.42
Notes: Means with standard errors in parentheses. The second column in each table gives the increase in out-of-pocket payments per claim if individuals instead held the $1000 deductible. If all claims were for losses exceeding $1000, this measure would be $750 for the $250-deductible customers and $500 for the $500-deductible customers. The increase in out-of-pocket payments per policy is a measure of the relative expected value of the lower deductible. It is calculated by averaging the increase in out-of-pocket payments that each indivdiual would have paid with the alternative $1000 deductible. Most did not file a claim, so for most this number is zero. The potential savings (the last column) is calculated at the individual level by taking the difference between that individual's potential reduction in yearly premium and the increase in out-of-pocket losses that individual would have experienced with the alternative $1000 deductible. Notes: This table gives percentile cuts on the bounds of the coefficient of relative risk aversion implied by various model assumptions. All calculations are for customers who joined the company during the sample year. The shaded columns show the lower and upper bounds at the 50th percentile of the distribution, while the unshaded columns show the lowerbound at the 25th percentile and the upper bound at the 75th percentile. The individual claim-rate estimates used for models 2-8 use predicted values from the poisson regressions described in the text. Model 4 uses initial wealth levels equal to the cusomter's insured home value (IHV). For the CARA model, the bounds on the coefficient of absolute risk aversion have been converted into measures of relative risk aversion assuming a wealth of $1 million to facilitate a comparison of the results of the CRRA and CARA models. The far-right column shows for each model the percent of the $500 and $250 customers who would reject any 50/50 gamble with a potential loss of $1000 based on the lower bound of risk aversion implied by their choices. See the text for further discussion.
$1000-ded Customers $500-ded Customers $250-ded Customers (n = 2,474) (n = 3,424) (n = 367) 
$250 Deductible 0.145738** 0.221724** 0.232335**
